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CHAPTER ONE

REALISM AND THE STATE OF THEORY IN PSYCHOLOGY
Nigel Mackay and Agnes Petocz

1. The Curious State Of Psychology: Empirical Expansion but
Theoretical Disarray
Psychology is flourishing. It is a hugely popular subject for study. In
application it finds its way into all corners of modern life. In empirical research there seems hardly a topic that the many thousands of
research psychologists in departments around the world do not investigate. And the development of varied and sophisticated techniques, from statistical modelling and multivariate analyses, to
computer-aided content analysis, to nuclear magnetic resonance
imaging, is extending its reach into areas inaccessible just a few
decades ago. The sheer volume of research output is enormous, with
some 200,000 references added annually to the American Psychological Association’s data base.
Yet, paradoxically, psychology is also struggling. Despite the volume of empirical research, psychology is no grand monolith rising
on a foundation of common psychological knowledge and theory.
The median readership of those 200,000 references is a mere 1. And
alongside the rapid expansion of the discipline there is a morass of
conflicting theories together with, for the most part, an insouciance
about the matter. Indeed, psychology is not so much one discipline
as many, a large, disparate and sprawling enterprise, whose subdomains, ranging from cultural studies to brain science, depend on
concepts of mind, action and person so various that they are almost
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unrecognisable as part of the same venture. In Kuhnian terms, psychology is still as described half a century ago, “pre-paradigmatic”
(Kuhn, 1962). And as every student of psychology soon realises,
there is little cohesion across the theories that are encountered in
psychology's different subdomains. Psychology is a veritable boom
town with scores of rambling unconnected buildings, some once
fashionable but abandoned, others planned but never built, some
large, many small, in different regions isolated from one another.
Perhaps a more apposite analogy would be that of a thriving circus.
As P. T. Barnum reportedly said of his “greatest show on earth”: "a
good circus should have a little bit of something for everyone". Psychology certainly qualifies.
1.1

Three Major Theoretical/Metatheoretical Groups in Psychology

To illustrate this theoretical disarray in psychology, we can, to begin with, identify roughly three major groupings of theoretical
commitment.
1.1.1 Cognitive/Neuroscientific Experimentalism: The Establishment Position
This first group is the self-consciously rigorous, cognitive/neuroscientific experimental group. These psychologists, with
a sense that they are part of the cognitive sciences which include
philosophy of mind as well as artificial intelligence and linguistics,
are committed to the computational, representational view of mind.
This is what Fodor and Pylyshyn christened the establishment position,
and Fodor called the “only game in town” (Fodor, 1975) which, in
spite of claims that connectionism supersedes it and other heralds
of paradigm shifts (see below), it remains. It holds that an objective,
scientific account of mind is available because the processes of cognition are information processes like those of computers, where input information is represented in internal symbols and subject to
manipulation by rule, in turn embodied in and constrained by the
neurology of the central nervous system, to produce behavioural
output. Crudely, the hardware is the brain, the software is the mind
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or programmes for information-processing, and the symbols (whose
exact form is still be discovered) on which the software operates are
neural, rather than simply electrical. Because the hardware is the
brain, cognitive experimentalism is married to neuroscience, and
increasingly looks to that discipline for its grounding and its development. But, in general, the basic notions are appropriated from
computer science and applied to the person: Minds have symbols,
architecture, circuitry, input-output devices, encode, store, access
and retrieve information and so on. Importantly, while the realisation of these processes is syntactic in character it is assumed that,
like computers, the information is indeed information, and refers to,
is about, events in the external world. The person differs from the
computer in that the person’s capacity to represent the world
comes about naturally, developmentally, rather than through the
system designer’s artifice.
1.1.2 The Majority View: The Metatheoretically Unreflective
The first group shades off into a second, more or less default, majority view, held by most psychologists and across traditional areas
devoted to learning, motivation, emotion, cognition, development,
personality, social, clinical and various kinds of applied psychology.
In its terminology and self-conception it adopts the de rigueur cognitivism of the first group, and similarly sees itself as part of the cognitive revolution, focusing on either behavioural data or operationally defined cognitive (mental) concepts. This majority view likewise defers to neuroscience, and the promise of its increasingly detailed discoveries. But it is metatheoretically unreflective—
something which permits an uncritical eclecticism and allows
metatheoretical confusion to flourish alongside the naïve belief that
psychology is a progressing science like any other. Where these
psychologists do state their metatheory, for example in the introductory chapters of textbooks, or in methods courses, it is that psychology is an empirical science whose subject matter since the fall
of behaviourism includes mind and behaviour, but whose methods
and scientific credentials stretch back into behaviourism: “Psychol-
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ogy is the science that studies behavior and the physiological and
cognitive processes that underlie it” (Weiten, 2007, p. 18). Most psychologists see this as unproblematic. It situates them in the postbehaviourist world, seems to deliver the scientific licence to measure various hypothesised internal factors (attitudes, abilities, beliefs, appraisals, expectations, emotions, values, perceptions, goals,
and so on—generally treated as internal representations), to model
their interactions (articulated in information-processing terminology), and then use statistical analyses to partial out the effects of
the multiple variables, and so to weigh their contributions and interactions. There are in contemporary psychology indefinite and
exponentially increasing numbers of such internal concepts posited,
then “operationally defined” in terms of some test as quantitative
variables.
1.1.3 Heterogeneous Group: Opposed to the Establishment Position
The first two groups constitute the mainstream, an orthodoxy characterised by adherence to the information-processing position underpinned by neuroscience—albeit adherence with varying degrees
of consistency and commitment. There is a third, heterogeneous
group whose members are the most explicit about their metatheoretical positions, perhaps because they are often defined in terms of
their opposition to the mainstream view of mind1. One part of the
group is constructivist, consisting of both social constructionists
(Danziger, 1997) and other constructivists (Raskin, 2006), in spite of
real differences between these. They have in common a rejection of
orthodox psychology, especially its social and personality theories,
and of the experimental-computational view. In particular they emphasise the idea that knowledge and perhaps reality are constructed
by personal or social discursive activity. Thus they focus on lan1

Several of the positions represented in this group are influenced by philosophers and philosophies as much as by other psychological metatheories as such. Thus constructionists may acknowledge a debt to Wittgenstein, or Rorty, and John Searle’s criticisms have alerted psychologists to
some problems of cognitive science.
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guage, conversation, narrative, and text of all kinds, drawing in the
hermeneutic tradition from broader social, cultural and literary disciplines. Both constructivism and social constructionism reject the
objectivism of traditional empirical psychology, and generally distinguish between the methods appropriate to the human and the
natural sciences, and between the “knowledges” that they generate.
Their sympathy tends towards postmodern accounts of science and
knowledge. One of the significant aspects of this approach is that it
is the one most favoured by the few journals dedicated to theory
and metatheory in psychology, and by the majority of theoretically
articulate and aware psychologists working in the theory and history domain.
1.2

Variations and Exceptions: It all Depends on Where and Who

But even these three groupings do not comprise the full picture. We
could include as another part of the third, heterogeneous group
various post-computational approaches to the mind that claim to
transform cognitive science and supersede the orthodox, computational metatheory of psychology. However, these approaches see
themselves as extensions of, rather than alternatives to, the mainstream. This is illustrated in the new embodied cognition movement
(Deary, 2006; Gallagher, 2005; Menary, 2007) or what has been described as the "new kid on the intellectual block embodied-embedded
cognitive science” (Wheeler, 2005, p. 11), or “ ‘second generation’
cognitive science” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 78). Its protagonists
hold that a complete cognitive science must incorporate the brain’s
bodily, environmental and evolutionary context (Kövecses, 2005). It
is also characterized by interdisciplinary or cross-disciplinary collaborations, some of which (such as neuro-psychoanalysis) would
have been unthinkable not so long ago, others (such as second generation cognitive science) retaining the empirical integration of
cognitive and developmental psychology, neuroscience, linguistics,
anthropology, and computer science, but replacing the mind-ascomputer metaphor with the concept of mind as embodied via sen-
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sorimotor experiences. These movements announce new theoretical
foundations and claim emancipation from Cartesian philosophical
foundations, and their replacement by some form of Heideggeriancum-ecological framework, citing as its sources aspects of pragmatism and the works of thinkers well outside of the standard pantheon of empirical psychology, such as Heidegger (1889–1976) and
Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961). Important for themes that will be discussed further in this book is the claim that we are already “in the
midst of an anti-Cartesian turn” (Wheeler, 2005 p. 16), which finds
us “propelled away from the traditional site of reason and representation that is the Cartesian mind, and toward the environmentally
embedded locus of embodied action” (p. 134).
Also worth mentioning in this context is critical realism, a general position on science with implications for psychological and social inquiry, and indeed social action. In contrast to social constructionism, critical realism stresses that psychology can be scientific,
yet argues against the orthodox empirical tradition, claiming that
psychology is not to be grounded in the positivist search for universal/general regularities, but must focus on identifying structures
that have causal powers to influence events, as well as function as
an agency of human emancipation (Bhaskar, 1998; Hartwig, 2007).
In this discussion of the philosophical affiliations of psychologists, we are taking as our reference point the typically empirical
psychology departments common in the English-speaking world.
But it is important to note, particularly in dealing with the third,
heterogeneous group, that a large amount of psychology is done
outside of the standard psychology department, and also internationally. Psychological theory is used and applied in various forms
in disciplines from psychiatry and medicine, through to education,
sociology, business, social policy, cultural studies, gender studies,
anthropology and others. These disciplines come with their own
traditions, different from those of the standard empirical psychology department, and are sustained by different philosophies and
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methodologies, which inevitably affect how psychology is thought
about. There is yet further variety in the non English-speaking
world where the disciplinary boundaries of psychology may be
drawn differently, opening their psychological theories and practices to influence from disciplines that might otherwise not be seen
as related to psychology. Thus, in many settings where psychology
is pursued, what is a minority position in a typical Anglophone empirical psychology department (e.g., constructivism) may be a majority position. For instance, in most Anglophone empirical psychology departments, psychoanalysis is treated as an historical oddity, and without scientific respectability, yet the psychology taught
in related disciplines, even in the English speaking world, may be
strongly psychoanalytic. Similarly, in a university with a religious
educational philosophy, approaches marginalised by the mainstream (e.g., phenomenology) may be considered central because of
their presumed compatibility with the religious outlook of the institution. And indeed much of the work on psychological theory that
we place in the heterogeneous group comes not from mainstream
empirical departments of the English-speaking world but from outside of these.
Furthermore, in making our classification into the three groups
cognitive/neuroscientific experimental, the majority view, and opposed to
the establishment, we use a broad brush: There are many distinctions
and variations within any of the groups, and similarities across
them, and key notions are interpreted in various ways. For other
purposes the field might be sectioned differently. For example, social constructionists reject representational accounts of mind, while
constructivists hold that representations are just what are being
constructed in psychological activity. Both the unreflective majority
and the cognitive/neuroscientific experimental groups use information-processing terminology, and since most psychologists accept
the idea that mental representations are built up from limited sensory input, they are in that sense also constructivist. To complicate
matters, one of the main distinctions that the embodiment theorists
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argue distinguishes the computational view and theirs is that in the
former, cognition involves a passive retrieval of information, while
the embodiment view is that cognition involves the motivated construction of percepts on the basis of bodily derived metaphors
(Kövecses & Palmer, 1999); this in spite of the common claim that it
is cognitivism, as opposed to behaviourism, that treats the subject
as active.
1.3

From Theoretical Disarray to Conceptual Confusion

What should be evident from even this brief survey is the extent of
psychology's theoretical and metatheoretical disarray. Although a
certain amount and kind of variety is healthy and would not be a
problem, the theoretical disarray in psychology is accompanied by
inconsistencies and conceptual confusions which undermine psychology's efforts to advance. These have not gone unnoticed and, in
addition to the long standing debates over the disunity of psychology (e.g., Sternberg, 2005), each group has been criticised for its
theoretical limitations and for its inability to provide a coherent
metatheoretical framework for psychology2. Wittgenstein (1953)
claimed that psychology's "confusion and barrenness" were to be
attributed not to its status as a "young" science, but to its odd mixture of "experimental methods and conceptual confusion" (p. 232,
emphasis in original). The mainstream groups, including cognitive
science, have been attacked for their misconceptions of science,
their pseudoscientific methodological practices, their misunderstanding and misuse of the various data-analytic techniques at their
disposal, and their implicit adherence to aspects of the Cartesian
dualism which they explicitly reject (Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Bickhard, 1992; Haack, 2003). The nonmainstream alternatives, in turn,
have been accused of sharing the mainstream’s misconceptions of

2

See Petocz (Chapter 16, this volume) for further discussion of the recent
new movements in psychology and their search for a metatheoretical
framework
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science, and of offering inconsistent foundational alternatives
(Greenwood, 1992; Hibberd, 2005a; Michell, 2004).
1.4

Psychology's Self-confidence

The majority of psychologists seem unaware or untroubled by psychology’s inconsistencies and confusions. Of course, psychologists
tend to work in subdomains that are comparatively coherent, and,
as we mentioned earlier, the flourishing state of psychology provides good apparent reasons for optimism: the scale of the research
output; the wealth of systematically gathered data in so many areas;
the ingenuity of modern instruments, methods and procedures; the
techniques that have enabled the ever more precise recording and
identification of brain function, and even the manualisation of
therapies—all of which have accompanied the rise of psychology.
Psychology's self-confidence seems to be driven by the idea that, in
this booming discipline, we have basically got it right, and that any
problems and intra-disciplinary rivalries will be overcome sooner or
later by more empirical research. More than 30 years after famously
saying that the computational theory of mind is the “only game in
town” (Fodor, 1975), Fodor, one of the most influential voices of the
cognitive revolution, says “What’s the alternative? RTM [the representational theory of mind] really is the only game in town” (2008, p.
113 italics in original). This is not just a comment on the fact that
the representational, computational view of mind continues to be
central to psychology—with which we must agree—but a claim that
it is so because it is “by far the best theory of cognition … the only
one worthy of serious discussion” (Fodor, 2000, p. 1)—with which we
do not agree, for reasons that will become clear.
From another part of psychology, veteran social/personality researcher and theorist Walter Mischel (2005) quotes a favourite Amos
Tversky remark that “for every 10 years of hard empirical work in
psychology you earn 10 minutes for talking about theory.” Yet, unconstrained by this injunction about theory, he gives his own theoretical prescriptions: In order to “build a stronger, more integrative
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and cumulative science” we should put our efforts into “demonstrating robust and replicable effects about important phenomena
and processes” and into bridging subdisciplines because “such
analyses can encompass, for example, what the individual experiences, thinks, and does at the psychological level; what the brain is
doing; and, ultimately, how the relevant biological processes play
out at all levels” (Mischel, 2005). He does not discuss the conceptual
incompatibilities between the concepts of these subdisciplines, nor
the conditions under which, say, intentionless neurobiological data
could be integrated into theories of human agency and meaning,
nor any of the other profound problems in the way of carrying out
this easy advice.
2. Realism
2.1

The General Force of Realist Critiques

The essays in this collection address themselves to this mix of confusion and confidence, to the complacency of the orthodox majority, to the received views on the computational model of mind and
the role of neuroscience, to the establishment assumptions about
how to do science, and to the various challenges to the establishment position. But, they do not do so by promising a “new paradigm”—though many of their implications are radical, and are likely
to be resisted because they subvert accepted views. Rather, we are,
in the first place, concerned with a different project: articulating the
realist principles that we hold must underlie any coherent science, and
demonstrating this thesis through analyses of psychological theories, concepts, methods and practices. This demonstration has positive and constructive aspects. In exposing the realism immanent in discourse
about the world, including of course the psychological world, the
realist critiques attempt to show what psychology would look like if
it were to adhere consistently to those realist principles. The critiques’ primary aim is to show not that some psychological position
is simply at odds with realism, but that the criticised theory fails to
meet the very standards of science, logic, and knowledge that their
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proponents hold, albeit implicitly, by virtue of entering into rational
discourse, and endeavouring to conduct scientific research into
human behaviour.
It will be argued that realist critiques have lessons for the casual,
anti-metatheoretical complacency of mainstream empirical psychology, which covers so much of its conceptual confusion with
sheer empirical effort. It will also be argued that the informationprocessing and the cognitive neuroscience establishment operates
with a number of deficient concepts and consequently proceeds
with hamstrung theories and a misdirected research program. The
deficiencies arise because the treatment of a number of key concepts in psychology (e.g., cognition, motivation) fails the standards
of science—despite the appearance of scientific soundness, because
they in turn rest on incoherent epistemological and ontological theses. If the underlying conceptual theses are flawed and inconsistent—and it will be argued that a number are—then the theories and
research that depend on them will be similarly flawed. The essays
also contain discussion of the ideas involved in several alternative
nonmainstream programs (constructivism, constructionism, situated cognition and so on) that in perhaps worthy attempts to rewrite psychology in noncomputational terms, to recognise the embodied nature of cognition, or to incorporate meaning, do so hampered by strains of a similar antirealism. And behind this (and in
spite of recent explicit attempts to free psychology from Cartesianism) is the constant and powerful pull of the Cartesian concept of
mind, a pull that for centuries, from Descartes himself, Locke and
the empiricists, through Reid and Kant to modern cognitivism
seems to have defeated all attempts to escape its grip.
2.2

Realism: The Background

Realism has multiple sources, in pre-Socratic philosophy, in Aristotle, in empiricism and reactions to it, and elsewhere. But the coming together of these sources and their expression as a coherent
metatheory of science, specifically the science of mind, and its dis-
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course is necessarily a modern development, accompanying as it
does relatively recent attempts to apply scientific methods to mental phenomena3. Some of the essays in this volume do refer to historically early realist sources in treating their topics. Most, however, take the work of Scottish-Australian philosopher John Anderson (1893-1962) as their starting point because the work of Anderson, arguably the most thoroughgoing and uncompromisingly realist of all philosophers, represents the major confluence of the various realist tributaries in the history of philosophy. Like his contemporaries Russell, Moore and others, Anderson rejected 19th century
idealism, but he also produced a distinctive and systematic philosophy maintaining, against contemporary trends, a realist account of
logic, a rejection of the universal-particular distinction and other
matters which he took to be residues of idealism or of an empiricism
tainted with Cartesian rationalism. And, against what he considered
to be his contemporaries’ overreaction to metaphysics, he held that
an understanding of the nature of existence must be central to philosophy and science.
Some things need to be said about Anderson and his place in the
history of ideas4. The realism we present here will be generally discussed simply as realism or situational realism for reasons that will
become clear. However, it is sometimes given an eponymous or regional qualification and called Andersonian, Australian or Sydney realism, and consequently has been depicted as “probably the least
known” of realisms (Greenwood, 1997, p. 605). Yet this latter nomenclature obscures its significant impact on philosophy, especially
philosophy of mind and philosophy of science—albeit an impact of3

One might date this from Hume’s attempt at a “moral science”, the Kantian and commonsense reaction to Hume and the continuation of empiricism, although Hume’s science is not recognisably scientific in the modern
empirical sense. It is more common to date the science of mind from the
establishment of empirical psychology in the late 19th century.
4
See Hibberd (Chapter 3, this volume) for a more thorough discussion of
Anderson and his development of situational realism.
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ten overlooked, unrecognised or indirect, through Anderson’s colleagues, students and even detractors. As we mentioned in the introduction to this book, it has shaped the influential treatments of
causality (Mackie, 1974) and of philosophical reasoning (Passmore,
1970), and influenced the exposé of idealism and scientific irrationalism in the philosophy of science (Stove, 1981, 1991). Moreover, its
hand may be seen in realisms better known than Anderson’s such as
the mind-brain identity theory of so called Australian materialism
(e.g., Armstrong, 1968; Place, 1956; Smart, 1959)5, about which is has
been said “all subsequent philosophy of mind is a response to or development of this view” (Wright, 1997). The reasons for the simultaneous relative obscurity and significant if unacknowledged influence of Anderson’s realism, are complex. Until the development of
rapid communication and travel, universities geographically distant
from the main centres in USA, UK and Europe were also academically isolated. Even in the context of the large English-speaking
world, such universities were relatively cut off, without easy access
to conferences, important committees and meetings. Many of
Anderson’s papers were published only in local journals and as part
of a philosophical conversation with antipodean intellectuals—in
spite of the very broad concerns he shared with his contemporaries
internationally. Another reason seems to have been a combination
of, ironically, the very power of Anderson’s intellect, and the perceived, perhaps real, intolerance of opposition that this power engendered in him. As a result, in an almost Oedipal ambivalence,
many of those whose work is clearly shaped by Anderson, and who
may be much better known, are relatively quiet or even disparaging
about the man whose realism they incorporated. One might note,
too, that Anderson was not a follower of fashion: He was, for example, willing to see the value in Kant, and he set out a systematic
metaphysics in what, at least amongst scientifically-minded and

5

Armstrong (2000) himself acknowledges his and others’ debts to Anderson.
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anti-idealist thinkers (for example Russell, Moore, the logical positivists), was an antimetaphysical age.
The Australian connection also requires comment. The main proponents of the identity thesis in the ’fifties, ’sixties and after were U.
T. Place, J. J. C. Smart and D. M. Armstrong, and their work is sometimes known as Australian materialism because of their location at
the time. Of course, this sort of scientific realism applied to the
problems of mind is not uniquely Australian; others such as the Austrian-American philosopher H. Feigl are associated with it. The Australian link is neither unknown nor surprising to the majority of
English-speaking philosophers6, although its debt to Anderson is
much less well known internationally.
Nor is it widely known that there is also a vigorous tradition of
psychological realism with the same Australian, indeed Andersonian,
connection. Like Australian materialism it is not parochial, and the
threads of that tradition interweave with those from British, particularly Scottish, and American thought—threads that go back
through Anderson variously to Samuel Alexander (1859-1938), to
Thomas Reid (1710-1796) and common sense realism, and also to the
American New Realists like E. B. Holt (1873-1946), and to William
James (1842-1910). Because Australian materialism and the realism
presented here share common antecedents in Anderson and his intellectual progenitors in British and American realist traditions, and
of course their common claim to realism7, they may from a broad
perspective be seen as part of the same realism; certainly they are
similarly concerned with the problems of mind. But there are sig6

Perhaps especially in the UK where there has long been an interchange
with Australian thought, to the extent that it is seen as part of, rather than
foreign to, the traditions of British philosophy.
7
There is other influential philosophical work (Mackie, 1974; Mackie,
Mackie, & Mackie, 1985; Passmore, 1970; Stove, 1981, 1991) that is in a similarly realist tradition influenced by Anderson, and an even closer counterpart to the psychological realism presented here than the identity theory
of mind. Baker (1986) provides a fine overview of Anderson’s philosophy.
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nificant differences: Some, albeit important, are subtle and need the
kind of extended exposition that only specialist scholarship can
provide8; others are more straightforward and worth mentioning in
connection with this book. The mind-brain identity theory is part of
the philosophy of mind, a subdiscipline of philosophy. It is professional philosophers who debate its issues, in philosophy journals
not much read by psychologists, and often in a highly technical language. And, even if psychologists would benefit from participating
in this discussion and from working through the implications for
their theory and practice, they generally do not. Many of the examples used by the identity theorists are removed from the idiom of
psychologists, discussing such things as whether the firing of “cfibres” might be identical to sensations. By contrast, the essays here
are in psychology, written by psychologists using psychological examples. Their method is to take actual psychological models and to
cut to expose the metatheoretical tissue beneath.
2.3

Realism: The Principles and their Relevance to Psychology

Most psychologists who consider themselves scientific would
probably be interested neither in philosophical disputes about realism, nor in ontological matters. They might wonder why they need
convincing about realism, or why psychology needs this examination. They would assume that they are realists, that their realism
comes as part of the scientific approach to their subject matter, and
that it is the scientist’s business to investigate and discover the
workings of an unproblematically real world through the application of the scientific method and its instruments.
Yet a couple of things might suggest to the thoughtful psychologist that the issue of realism is rather more complex and important
in the study of mind than in other sciences. One is that the major
changes in psychology in the past hundred years have been shifts in
8
See Hibberd’s chapter on Anderson and situational realism in this volume,
and other works (e.g., Hibberd, 2002, 2005b)
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what we take to be real and investigable—consciousness, mind, behaviour, cognitive states, brain states, and so on. And allied to this is
the refractoriness of psychology’s subject matter. For all the sophistication of modern methods, the exact status of what it is that is under examination, the mental somethings that the theories point to
and the methods supposedly reveal, is never far from debate and
challenge. Unlike the successful natural sciences in whose steps we
wish to follow, consensus seems impossible to establish, except in
the weak terms typical of introductory texts: "Psychology is the
study of mind and behaviour”.
Realism may be expressed as a number of interlinked principles
about ontology, epistemology, causation, science and so on. But although these principles are not hard to state in brief form—we do
this below, and it is done in other essays of this collection—like
most general philosophical positions, and because the principles are
so closely interlinked, mere enumeration of them is insufficient. It is
only in their elaboration and application that they may be grasped
properly. Indeed, a peculiarity of realism is that, while it sits well
enough with common sense, the directness and force of its claims
often appear startlingly, incredibly, simplistic to psychologists and
philosophers. For example, the claim that we may know facts directly is just not taken seriously by psychologists who generally accept as an obvious fact that knowledge is indirect, and that psychological theory must account for how we achieve the miracle of
veridical perception via mental representations.
2.3.1 The Conditions of Discourse and the Idea of Speakability.
Two closely related ideas need to be introduced as a preface to the
principles proper. Although the nature of debate requires any protagonist to present ideas as if they constitute a theory to be evaluated and considered, and we must perforce do the same with realism, we hope the basic realist arguments presented here get assent
from readers not on the grounds of subscription to the “right
metatheory” but because they compel agreement through princi-
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ples already in place and shared by the reader, that is, through reason, on grounds that reasoning beings hold, indeed must hold, because discourse requires them: They are inescapable, and the alternative is ultimately solipsism. We understand realism to be these
grounds. The aims of the essays in this collection are first to expose
what these grounds are and then to work through the implications
for various aspects of psychology. To enter discourse, to argue about
issues, to say one thing is evidence for another, to propose an account of human behaviour is, in the sense of realism we use here,
necessarily to be realist—even if in these acts one denies that necessity and ends up in contradiction. This is the idea of speakability, the
thesis (not peculiar to realism) that all argument rests on the possibility of discourse. Positions which by implication are selfcontradictory remove themselves from (intelligible) discourse, and
are not speakable, as John Anderson has it. Of course, while the essays attempt to set out the grounds for discourse (realism as we understand it) and sketch a psychology that is compatible with these,
that is not to suggest in any way that these attempts themselves are
incorrigible or beyond argument.
Discourse and argument depend on the existence both of the
events to which reference is made and other rational persons who
refer to the same events—events independent of the observers; reasoning depends on the fact (also independent of observers) that one
situation follows from another and excludes yet others; to disagree
is to assume and exemplify the fact that something cannot be both
itself and not itself, and the very act of disagreement embodies and
expresses the fact that things may be known. Thus, for example,
claiming that there is a real world but that one cannot know it, or
that all knowledge is via representation, contradicts the speaker’s
claim to knowledge implied in making that statement: They are performative self-contradictions. The requirement of the possibility of
discourse then becomes a powerful tool in reducing ad absurdum
doctrines which at first seem appealing.
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It is in consequence of this that, as mentioned above, the realism
of these essays is not offered as a new paradigm or the best metaphor for understanding the mind. The essays scrutinize psychological theories and concepts in an attempt to identify and spell out the
principles that must constrain and direct a scientific psychology.
The aim is to demonstrate the constraints that psychological theories are under (or they fall into incoherence), and so to sketch their
possible, conceptually viable and empirically investigable forms.
2.3.2 Ontological Egalitarianism, Antidualism and the Situational/Propositional Nature of Reality.
The starting point for most realisms is a realist ontology, the thesis
that the world and all its facts exist independently of any mind's
apprehension of them. Realists are united by the claim that the
world exists independently of mind: Mind does not constitute the
world. Of course, mental processes are part of the world, and it is
analytically true that if there were no cognising organisms there
would be no mind or mental processes. But neither the non-mental
parts of the world, nor the mental processes within the world, exist
by virtue of being thought about. Still, the depiction of this mind independent world is different across different kinds of realism. While
many different philosophical positions are supposedly compatible
with this basic, almost unexceptionable, ontological assertion, it is
common for theorists to start with this assumption and then to go
on to develop other principles in contradiction to it, thus implicitly
denying it.
The distinctive and organising principle of situational realism is
its ontological egalitarianism, the claim that there is only "a single way
of being" (Anderson, 1962, p. 42). And the one way of being is that
indicated when something is true. This implies an antidualism that
is general, not merely the one common to psychology about mind
and brain, but one that extends to all attempts to say what is real. It
is a rejection of the claim that there can be more than one kind of
reality. This is important in rejecting not only grand idealist sys-
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tems which talk of higher and lower order realities and truths, but
any attempt to stratify reality. A full argument for this requires discussion of the categories of being9, but the force of it may be conveyed by pointing out that the claim that there are two (or more)
kinds of reality, say, mind and matter, my reality and yours, must be
about some overarching, third (or greater) subsuming kind of reality, and this implied third must include the relations between these
original two (or more), making the distinction empty or the position
incoherent. Indeed to pursue the dualist argument is to end in an
infinite regress of realities. And when critical realism holds, as it
seems to do, that reality is stratified, or when constructivism argues
for multiple realities, these are claims about different kinds of reality. But these claims differentiate and relate the kinds of reality on
some grounds, so they assume some reality that is superordinate to
or outside the specific kinds. Yet were the claims true the reality
they refer to would simultaneously have to belong within one of the
strata or kinds of reality, and yet superordinate to them. These
claims are incoherent.
There is in this realism not just the rejection of dualism, but the
positive claim that this single way of being is that of the situation, or
fact, something being the case in time and space. The same may be
conveyed by saying that reality is propositional. Anything that can
be true, beliefs, statements and so on, is propositional in that they
state that something is the case. Note that this connects ontological
with epistemological matters (discussed further below) in that the
proposition is the minimum that may be known; that is, that may be
true or real, as one cannot know what is not true. Use of the term
proposition can be confusing because of its widespread use to mean
some sort of linguistic or representational entity separate from the
reality that it describes—a position rejected by situational realism.
What is meant here is that the form of reality is that of the proposi9

For a more detailed discussion of this see Michell (in press)
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tion (situation): something being predicated of another. Indeed, this
is the foundation of realism's ontological egalitarianism. Whatever
exists, no matter how grand or trivial, psychological, chemical or
physical, is a situation that exists in space and time, and belongs to
the one order of being. Whether one predicates something of the
whole universe (the universe is ever expanding) or something specific (the cat is on the mat) the way of being is identical, indicated
by the copula, is. Further, precisely because it involves something
predicated of another thing, the situation is necessarily complex, for
there is nothing less than the situation. A supposed particular or
“simple” cannot be spoken or known. To continue with the cat on
the mat: One cannot intelligibly speak just “cat” for the least that
can intelligibly be conveyed is something about the cat. There is a
cat there, perhaps. Nor can one know “cat” simpliciter; “cat” on its
own (whatever that might mean). One can at a minimum know
something predicated of a cat. It exists perhaps, or is on the mat.
Such a simple then cannot be true (only a proposition can be true or
false); it cannot be real (the least that can be is compound); it cannot
be known; it cannot be asserted. Facts are complex situations in
time and space. Hence the orthodox empiricist distinction between
particulars and universals is rejected and, as will be explored later,
cognitive psychology must deal with the way the person apprehends complex situations, rather than just with “object recognition”.
Situational realism, holding that reality consists of states of affairs,10 necessarily complex, and propositional in form, opposes the
“thingist” view of the real (that reality is "things out there" floating
about in space and time). This highlights the fact that all assertions
(if they are part of discourse) are putative descriptions of situations,
10

This has some similarity to Armstrong’s “states of affairs” (1997) something which he acknowledges (2000), and to Wittgenstein’s “the world is
the totality of facts, not of things” (Wittgenstein & Russell, 1922, Proposition 1.1). However, situational realism is not atomistic but carries through
the implication that situations are necessarily complex.

THE STATE OF THEORY IN PSYCHOLOGY

37

reality. And this must include all the claims typical of philosophical
arguments about such things as what is real, and what may be
known. One supposes that any sort of metatheory would wish to be
reflexive in this manner. Yet it is common for discussions about philosophical matters to be conducted as though the protagonists'
comments, being about such abstract matters as logic, possibility,
and implication, do not need to be taken as statements about reality, perhaps because logic, possibility, and implication do not seem
to be directly about material objects (things) in time and space. So
such discussions are treated as though they are somehow parenthetical to actual claims about the real. But in Anderson’s realism
“all assertions" means just that: No claim is ontologically parenthetical or in any other way fails to be a claim about reality. A claim
about logic or implication is in situational realism about the very
forms of reality, and the same order of being as any other. This goes
against the trend in cognitive psychology, computational theory,
logic and mathematics, often followed by supposed realists, that
formal concepts such as those in logic and mathematics11 do not belong in, do not describe, the world, but are features just of thought,
existing in the heads of persons—so reasoning is “following rules”,
and classes, categories and kinds are constructed by the person and
imposed on the world. In a different context, the critic of realism
who wishes to get the last word in a debate by asserting that realism
is merely the realist’s assumption, that there are different orders of
reality, is still making, as one always must, a claim about reality—a
claim articulated at the same and only level of reality available, that
where something is the case. The copula, is, is the great leveller.
A couple of matters are worth noting here. Realism is concerned
with logical and ontological matters in priority, as it were, over
epistemological matters: Only by first grasping what are the “conditions of existence” (how things are) can we sensibly treat epistemological issues (how we know them). Psychology, as its identification
11

See McMullen, Chapter 8, and Sutcliffe, Chapter 11, in this volume.
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as cognitive psychology indicates, naturally concentrates on epistemological matters, so the importance of this may not be easy to see at
first, but later essays will argue that those questions may often be
clarified via analysis of ontological matters. Of course, the cognitive
situation is itself an ontological matter, and further ontological issues are central to psychology. The fact that there are also ontological matters at issue in psychology is shown clearly in the mindbrain problem, and in various reifications, for example, the ideas of
consciousness, and of cognitions that exist as things in the mind.
A further implication of the position is that as psychological
situations are no less or more real than physical ones, in this sense
realism is antireductionist. That is to say, realism understands cognitions to be real situations in time and space, sui generis, and not
decomposable into either their parts or eliminable in favour of
“more fundamental” substances like brain events. Psychological
explanation requires us to show how cognition, which is a type of
relation between person and situation (see below on this crucial
matter) features as a cause in the production of behaviour. And psychological explanation, drawing as it does on situations just as real
as any others, is not merely a prelude to a “proper” neurochemical
formulation.
2.3.3 Determinism and a Field/Network Approach to Causality.
Determinism is a corollary to the principles of realist ontology
sketched above; if things exist, they must have a nature and thus be
both constrained by that nature and, in turn, constrain other things.
All situations are caused and in turn cause other situations. We can
in fact see this, and do think and behave as though this principle is
true—indeed it is difficult to conceive of a world in which we did
not. That is, we can have direct knowledge of the determinacy of
events. Our lives (and of course psychological theories in as much as
they assume expectable relations to hold between events) depend
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entirely on this. Further, causal relations12 are complex: They occur
within a causal field. By this is meant that the conditions under which
an event produces another includes a range of events or situations,
a field, and the causal relation may not obtain in a different field.
Causality is not a linear sequence of A's causing B, but of A's causing
B within context C. What for purposes of explanation is picked out as
the cause is neither linearly nor simply related to its effect but one
which operates in a specific and causally relevant context. This
stands in contrast both to the simple, correlational conception of
cause that operates in much psychological experimentation and to
the attempts to improve on the latter in formulations such as so
called “reciprocal causation” (Bandura, 1986).
2.3.4 Relations as Nonconstitutive
Much of psychology is interested in relational situations such as
those involving mental processes and behaviours, or mind and environment. Discourse requires that in consideration of situations that
involve relations we distinguish between entities and the relations
into which they may enter. No entity is constituted by the relations
into which it enters. Nothing may have its relations intrinsic to it:
Anything must have properties of its own, independent of any other
thing to which it may be related, in order to be something that can
enter into relations at all. We could not sensibly talk of a relation
(say, distance or causation) between events (say, the distance of the
horse from the wall, or the batter causing the ball to fly off) without
distinguishing, ontologically and logically, the entities (the terms of
the relation) from one another and from the relations into which
they enter. The distance is not any part of horse or wall; and we
must specify the event that causes (the batter) and the event that is
caused (the ball flying off) independently from each other, in terms
of their intrinsic properties, to grasp what happened between them.
Furthermore, situations are, so to speak, nested: The situation the
12

This is on the understanding that causation is a relation between independent situations or events.
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horse is a metre behind the wall is itself a state of affairs that can enter
into relations with others as, for example, when it affects someone’s
perception. Nonetheless the two complex situations, the horse being
a metre behind the wall, and the horse’s being a metre behind the wall obscuring the jockey’s vision, are equally real, both complex situations in
time and space.
At this point our focus shifts to epistemological matters, for the
principle of the nonconstitutive nature of relations joins with a realist epistemology to yield a relational view of mind.
2.3.5 Epistemology: Knowing as a Relation
Realism holds that we can and do have objective knowledge of the
world, specifically of situations or facts. This is the epistemological
corollary of a realist ontology. Of course the claim that there is a
real world is, in its assertion, a claim that one has knowledge of just
that fact. But more generally, realist ontology and epistemology interlock in that what is known is true, so must be the case, a fact. For
situational realism those facts are among the infinitely complex and
numberless situations that obtain in space and time.
In one sense psychology is concerned with epistemology even
more intimately than are other sciences, because its subject matter
includes beings that know, persons, and it investigates the nature of
persons and minds and the processes that bring about knowledge.
In this way the modern identification of psychology with cognitive
psychology is correct. But more is needed to clarify this important
matter. To speak of knowledge is to imply a knower, some event or
fact that is known13, and that these two are related in the specific
way that constitutes knowing. That is, it is to recognise that knowledge is a relation. And, as always, the terms of the relation are independent of one another and of the relation into which they enter.
The logic of relations, introduced above, and here applied to human
13
See John Anderson, The knower and the known, Chapter 4 of this volume.
The same matter is discussed earlier in Holt et al., (1912).
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knowing requires us to distinguish the cognising subject or person
from that which is cognised. Each (person and fact) must have its
own intrinsic properties. With respect to the knower, then, neither
the knowing relation into which the person enters, nor the matters
known, can be part of the person's properties.
This insistence that knowledge is a relation may seem superfluous for, at least in discussions about the intentional nature of mind,
it is acknowledged that cognitions (beliefs, knowledge, schemata
etc.,) are about something, and so our commonsense mental language does often convey that we are dealing with relations. But psychology generally fails to work through the fact that cognition is a
relation, and mental talk, especially that in psychological theory,
also treats cognitions as if they were things in the mind, indeed in
the brain, internal to the person, specifiable independently of anything outside the person. Indeed, modern psychological theory,
with its functionalist philosophy, proceeds in direct contradiction of
the logic of relations. It explicitly defines mental processes by their
relations (functions). Yet simultaneously it attempts to treat mental
“things” and processes as independent entities with measurable
dimensions—exactly like the entities of the natural sciences we wish
to emulate—because this is what is required for events to be causes
in a properly causal, scientific psychology. Hence, in this cognitivist
scheme beliefs (cognitions) are simultaneously, and impossibly,
treated on the one hand as if they are entities that occupy space and
time, specifically within the mind/brain, may be measured, may be
causes or effects of other independently occurring events, and on
the other as defined by their relations. A belief (e.g., that the cat is
on the mat) is simultaneously defined as a wholly internal, ontologically independent, mental state of the believer and yet specified in
terms of its relation to the cat being on the mat (what it is about).
In contrast realism leads to a relational and extended view of mind, in
the sense that the mind consists of the person, situations in the external world (many of which may of course be physically within the
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individual, as when one self-consciously sees one’s own mental
state—see below), and relations to these situations. Studying the
internal state of the individual is relevant, but only insofar as it tells
us something about the internal enabling conditions of cognitive
relations. Knowledge of that internal state alone is knowledge of
one term only of such mental relations with the external, and it is
not knowledge of the mental relation as such.
A whole range of problems about the nature of mind flows from
this failure in psychology to distinguish entities from the relations
into which they enter. Some of psychology’s main subjects of investigation, and the accompanying difficulties in getting any purchase
on them, are brought about through this failure. Take, for example,
what is termed consciousness. There, the relation being conscious of is
reified and rendered as consciousness, a thing or a process whose
mysterious and ineffable nature constitutes the problem of consciousness—something impossible to study, whatever employment it may
provide for cognitive scientists, and enjoyment for philosophers.
We should note that cognitive relations themselves may be
among the objects of knowledge. For example, a person may know
that another knows that the earth is round. And, importantly, persons often know that they know something. This particular sort of
cognitive relation is what may reasonably be understood by self consciousness. Knowing something is not the same as knowing that one
knows that thing. The latter is a subspecies of knowing things. It is of
course psychologically important because it seems to be essential to
what makes humans vastly more intellectually complex and sophisticated than their primate relatives. But knowing that one knows
has no special ontological status: It is not the mysterious something
that is created by reification of the cognitive relation; not some Cartesian thing that sits at the heart of being.
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2.3.6 Science as Critical Inquiry:
The last aspect of realism to be mentioned here is a general position
on the nature of science. As with speakability, this is neither strictly
a principle of realism as such nor peculiar to it. Its bases are: Firstly,
it follows from the facts that we can and do have knowledge and
that all knowledge is of the one order (i.e., knowledge of situations),
that there is no fundamental difference between ordinary knowledge and scientific knowledge; secondly, we can in principle be
wrong about any knowledge claims we make, and indeed often are
wrong, so all claims of knowledge require evaluation. Science, understood as critical inquiry, is a systematic error-correction procedure, itself fallible, but the means by which we evaluate such claims.
Here, it is instructive to say what science is not: It is not working
within a paradigm (an idea largely inspired by the relativist thesis
that paradigms generate their own conditions of truth), nor is it the
application of a set of techniques; it is not the application of the experimental method, nor is it quantitative analysis, though it may
involve any of these. It neither provides the imprimatur of certified
truth (a thesis often wrongly attributed to realism), nor is it merely
another social activity, for it must be understood as a cognitive activity. Importantly for psychology, the element of critical evaluation
in science is not merely empirical: Conceptual examination of theories’ claims and inferences is just as much part of science, and as
much part of the testing of empirical hypotheses, as are the various
empirical and observational tests which follow. The principal implication for psychology, a point well exemplified in the essays here, is
that the examination of the conceptual bases of psychology is just as
much science as empirical testing, indeed no amount of the latter
can substitute for the former. Philosophy is not then, as commonly
held by psychologists, the source of alien and fruitless debate, or
extra-scientific interference. It is about the very conditions of science, and fundamental to its purpose.
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2.4

Translating Realist Principles into Psychological Metatheory

Each of the principles discussed above, and the ways in which they
are intimately interrelated, are of close relevance to psychology,
and will be called on often in the essays of this collection. Although
we have tried to give some idea of their implications for psychology,
we recognise that their importance might not be immediately obvious to the psychological reader. To bring what might still seem to be
abstract theses closer to psychology, it is worth indicating some
general issues in psychology on which they have special bearing. By
general issues we mean metatheoretical matters commitments on
which constrain and direct psychological theory and investigation.
The realist re-conceptualisation of these alters them to such a degree that, so to speak, the agenda of psychology is reset. Emerging
from the realism sketched above are the theses that: (i) The loci of
investigation for psychology are embedded in the cognitive situation; (ii) mind is relational and extended; (iii) mind is causal, but the
conventional formulation of this, involving causally efficacious internal mental entities, is incoherent; and (iv) motivation must play a
large part in any full psychological explanation. These are themes
that the essays in this collection return to again and again in different forms and for various purposes.
2.4.1 The Loci of Psychological Investigation: Embedded in the Cognitive
Situation
The cognitive situation, which we are taking to be the fundamental
locus of investigation for psychology, consists of three elements, the
cognisor or person, the object that is cognised, and the relation between
that constitutes the act of cognition. And correspondingly there are
three groups of questions of interest to psychologists that the cognitive situation raises. The first group asks what is the cognising
subject or person and what is it that equips it to cognise the world,
including of course parts of itself. The second asks what is it that is
cognised. The third asks about the nature of the cognitive relation.
This way of presenting the major issues in psychology may sound
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strange to psychologists. The second and third questions in particular are not in forms that psychologists would easily fit to their interests and practices. For example, most people take it as part of
common sense that a person sees objects in the environment, the
book on the table, a smile on a face, a car passing by, and one might
expect from this that the objects of cognition are the things and
events in the world. But of course almost all developed theories of
cognition, in spite of the fact that they must start with this as a
given, end up maintaining that things and events in the world are
only the object of cognition in some indirect sense, and that the direct objects of cognition are indeed in the mind, representations of
those external things. Similarly, rather than ask the realist question
what is the cognitive relation, psychologists ask the typically cognitivist question how does the mind process the information it receives from
external sources and put together a picture of and a response to the events
in the world from which this information derives. We do not say that the
former, realist question sets an easy programme for psychology, but
the latter, cognitivist question sets an impossible one, because it
depends on the truth of principles with which it is in conflict: It
calls upon what must be a directly known fact, that the mind receives information, in order to develop an explanation of cognition
that is wholly indirect.
At its most general, the purpose of specifying and separating the
elements of the cognitive situation in this fashion is to show the issues of psychology in a different light, and that the positions one
takes on these fundamental, ontological issues—issues which most
psychologists think of as either irrelevant to their work or assume
to be already resolved sufficiently for them to proceed without concern—do make a difference. It also shows the relational and extended nature of mind.
2.4.2 Mind as Relational and Extended
Given the cognitive situation as described above, mental (intentional) phenomena are to be understood not in the reified vocabu-

46

NIGEL MACKAY & AGNES PETOCZ

lary of beliefs, desires, cognitions, and similar mental things and
processes in the mind. Nor, in reificatory terms, as things and processes internal to the mind, that cause behaviour. Instead, mental
phenomena are relations between the person (though the question
of what is the person in this context needs refining and specifying)
and external situations. The primary relation is that of cognition
and “a cognition” is the relation between the knower and the
known: real, but not a reification. Mind is thus extended and not
located, as it traditionally has been, within the bodily limits of the
person nor exclusively identifiable with any part of the nervous system or brain. In that sense, there is no "mind" at all, if it is conceived as an entity. This of course recasts the standard problems of
the philosophy of psychology, such as the so-called ontological
problem, because there is no mental thing for which the protagonist
in a discussion of the mind- brain relation has to find a corresponding and identical brain thing. All (though it is a very big “all”) we
have to do is identify which (presumably) brain processes subtend
the cognitive relation to the external objects of cognition. These
brain processes are of course the first term in the cognitive relation
and defined by their intrinsic properties, as any thing must be, not
by any intentional or cognitive properties. Though of course what is
special about these brain processes, and distinguishes them from
other processes, is that they have the capacity to enter into cognitive relations. It is this capacity to which the research attention of
the realist neuropsychologist should be directed, so as to investigate
what features of the brains of cognising creatures enable them to be
sensitive to the propositional structure (Michell, in press) of the
world. For all our advanced techniques, and research effort, we
seem only to be at the start of this research.
2.4.3 Mind as Causal and Determined
Realism rejects the idea of mental things and processes wholly internal to the person, and so must reject the traditional picture that
the causal links between mind and behaviour consist of internal
mental processes (beliefs and desires as states of the mind/brain)
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causing behaviour. Of course, since a mental relation includes as one
of its terms the physiological state of the person, internal biological
processes do have their causal roles in producing behaviour and we
should want to know what it is about the brain and biology of cognising creatures that enables them to enter cognitive relations.
Moreover, realism is still committed to a determinist account of behaviour: All situations are caused and in turn bring about other
situations. The causes that the realist will then be interested in are
those relational situations that span internal and external events, for example, that are constituted by a person in a cognitive relation with
some other situation, and which in turn bring about an effect.14
Moreover, the complex context within which such a cause brings
about its effect is of interest. And an important part of this complex
context which is identified as the causal field is the motivational
state of the cognising person.
2.4.4 The Motivated Subject
The theme of the connection between cognition and motivation is
one that will also recur in a number of the essays of this collection.
Realism shares with a large part of psychology the idea that cognitions are real, and that they feature in the causes of behaviour.
However, realism also argues that, properly understood, cognitions
are not wholly internal mental states, but “cognitive relational
situations”. While cognitive psychology typically focuses on cognition as though that were is all that there is involved in causes of behaviour, it clearly is not. Cognitive psychology misses the vital point
that cognition per se implies no policy for action. That is to say, no
matter what an organism cognises, however beneficial or threatening to it is the object cognised, it is insufficient to produce action
unless the organism is in an appropriate and related motivational
state. The knowledge of available food will not produce action (say,
moving towards the food, eating it) unless the cognising organism
14
See Medlow (Chapter 22, this volume) for an extended discussion of the
realist view of mental causation
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wants food. This is the belief plus desire account of behaviour. And as
long as beliefs (cognitions) feature in causal explanations and are
real and sui generis (as realism holds), then those explanations require a complementary desire (motive) element if the explanation is
to be complete. As we will see in the essays that follow, this has led a
number of authors, following Maze (e.g., 1983) to argue that the
primary term in the cognitive relation, that we normally refer to
rather indefinitely as the person or knower, is one or another of the
person's motivational structures, the instinctual drives. This of
course is drives physiologically conceived, and not as any sort of
entities defined by what they seek. In this is the recognition that
knowledge—contra constructivist and postmodern views of realism—is objective in the sense that its object is a real situation, but is
never disinterested because it is always motivated. Knowledge of
situations operates to produce behaviour because the situations are
relevant to the satisfaction or otherwise of motives.
Finally, we will see again and again in the essays of this collection
(and the discussion and analysis of them in Chapter 2) that the orthodox treatment of all things mental, mental structures and concepts, cognitive processes, the extension of mind, measurement of
the mental, the conceptualisation of class and category, meaning
and semantics, symbolism, motivation and affects, turn out to have
conceptual problems. Entities and events are confused with the relations that hold between them; the extended domain of mind is
collapsed into internal supposedly mental entities that cannot feature in proper causal explanations; entities are mysteriously supposed to contain their own causes or effects; behavioural patterns,
analysed by statistical methods that require the determinacy of behaviour, are theorised to be caused by internal, non-determined
autonomous agencies; supposedly causal processes that, in order to
be causes, must be specified independently of their effects, are defined by their effects; cognitions and beliefs are treated as if they
had within them a directional force implying action; and so on. If
these realist critiques are right, large sections of psychology require
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both reconceptualisation and redirection of research attention before we can do justice to the wealth of skills, ingenuity, data, observational techniques and research methods of modern psychology.
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